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1 Introduction
Recent papers underline the key role of the creation and destruction of goods (extensive margin
of activity) on output uctuations. Empirically, Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010) nd that
over a ve-year period, new products (developed either by existing or new rms) represent
46.6% of GDP in the US, while the value of goods destruction represents 44% of that GDP.
In contrast, the intensive margin of activity (i.e., the uctuation in the production of existing
goods) accounts for only half of these gures. The quantitative role of the creation of new
goods is also highlighted by Broda and Weinstein (2010) who report that, on average, every
year around 9% of US consumer spending is on purchases of new goods.
In the theoretical front, Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2010) build a framework to study the
implications of rm creation on business cycle analysis. They consider competitive rm entry
when the prospective value of new rms is higher than a sunk cost representing the initial
investment in new production lines. By doing so, they are able to replicate stylized facts such
as the procyclicality of rm entry and prots and the countercyclicality of mark-ups. The
sticky-price version of this model has been developed by Bergin and Corsetti (2008), and Lewis
(2009) to conduct business cycle and monetary policy analysis.
Regarding the nancial aspects of the creation of new rms, the models currently available
in the literature assume that investment in new productive units is carried out by households
through the accumulation of shares in their portfolio allocation. As a consequence, new rms
are created as soon as the current value of future dividends is greater than the building cost
of the rm. Even though such a solution is a convenient way of thinking about the creation of
rms on a protable segment of the goods market, it ignores the key role of the banking system
in providing funds for rm entry. This is one of the objectives of this paper: to study how both
credit availability and a variable number of rms might a¤ect economic activity.
In our model, nancial frictions are modelled through a liquidity constraint that is binding
on expenditures for both consumption purchases and investment on rm creation. As a conse-
quence, rm entry does not only depend on the sole protability of investment but also on the
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availability of loans needed to nance the new production lines. The amount of loans depends
on both banking labor and the stock of collateral. Thus, nancial frictions are introduced
through two elements of distortion: the (contractionary) nancial requirement for investment
in new rms/goods and the (expansionary) collateral service of rm value. In addition, the
introduction of a loan production technology will be used to examine how changes in bank-
ing e¢ ciency can be transmitted to aggregate variables that belong to the real sector of the
economy.
After describing the competitive equilibrium model in steady state and calibrating its struc-
tural parameters, the role of nancial factors and rm creation is examined by comparing the
baseline model to variants in which either rm entry/exit or nancial frictions are dropped. The
results show that the nancial constraint has contractionary e¤ects on the number of rms, out-
put, labor, and consumption; with permanent declines that range between 1.5% and 5%. As
for endogenous rm creation, we carry out simulation exercises that show how the quantitative
e¤ects of changes in productivity, banking e¢ ciency and market power are heavily inuenced
by procyclical rm entry. The contribution of the dynamics of rm creation/destruction plays
a very important role to explain the reaction of output to changes in productivity, banking
e¢ ciency and the elasticity of substitution (market power). By contrast, the intensive margin
of output (at rm level) shows little reaction after a technology shock and opposing (counter-
cyclical) reactions after changes in either banking e¢ ciency or market power. In the model
without rm entry/exit, the responses of aggregate output are completely determined by the
reactions of rm-level output.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and denes its
general equilibrium in steady state. Section 3 provides a numerical calibration of parameters and
compares the polar cases regarding the role of rm entry and nancial requirements. Section 4
carries out the quantitative analysis of the impact of changes in productivity, banking e¢ ciency,
and market protability. Section 5 concludes.
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2 A model with rm entry and nancial frictions
The model describes a closed economy where production, consumption and banking activities
take place. Each rm is specialized in the production of one good, and the number of rms is
endogenously determined. Financial frictions are introduced through a liquidity constraint on
consumption and rm creation.
2.1 Households
For any given period t; the representative household allocates consumption among nt varieties of
nal goods (indexed by !). Consumption goods are imperfectly substitutable in the households
consumption basket. The aggregation in the basket of goods, ct; and also for the cost of living
index, P ct , are constant-elasticity combinations of nt varieties,
ct =
Z nt
0
ct (!)
 1
 d!
 
 1
and P ct =
Z nt
0
Pt (!)
1  d!
 1
1 
;
where  > 1 is a constant elasticity of substitution as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Dening the
relative price of good ! as t (!) =
Pt(!)
P ct
, the optimal consumption of good ! is
ct (!) = (t (!))
  ct: (1)
Both purchases of consumption goods and investment on the creation of new rms are nan-
cially constrained as in Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), and Casares and Poutineau (2011).
Thus, households demand liquidity tp cover desired spendings on current consumption and rm
creation, which dene the liquidity constraint as follows
ct + n
e
tvtxt+1 = V
Lt
P ct
: (2)
On the left of (2), netvtxt+1 represents the total market value of new rms because n
e
t is the
number of rms created in period t;while vt is the value of rm equity and xt+1 is the fraction of
the total capital of new rms acquired by the household. On the right of (2), Lt is the amount
of nominal loans, and V is a velocity parameter that is introduced to yield a realistic ratio of
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provided liquidity over loans. A Cobb-Douglas banking technology determines the amount of
loan production
Lt
P ct
= B(bt+1 + ntvt)
(mdt )
1 ; (3)
where B > 0, and 0 <  < 1 are constant parameters, bt+1 is the real value of bonds in period
t that serves as a collateral for loan creation, nt is the number of total existing rms, and mdt
denotes the household demand for labor at the bank. Therefore, it is assumed that the equity
value of existing rms, ntvt; is accepted as a collateral to back the distribution of loans, once
corrected by a penalizing parameter, 0 <  < 1; in a way that recognizes the di¢ culty of
monitoring market value of rms relative to bonds:
Following Bilbiie et al. (2010), households hold two types of assets: shares in a mutual fund
of rms and a one-period composite bond. Hence, the representative household can choose
what fraction xt+1 of the economy-wide mutual fund to own, which is currently delivering a
real dividend equal to dt. Alternatively, households can also buy government bonds: the amount
of real bonds, bt, that were subscribed in the previous period earn a real interest rate, rbt , and
the household must decide the amount of bonds for the next period, bt+1. Hence, the budget
constraint faced by the representative household in period t is
wt(l
s
t +m
s
t  mdt ) + dtntxt + gt = ct + vtnt (xt+1   xt) + vtnetxt+1 + (1 + rbt ) 1bt+1   bt;
where there are two types of labor income: supplying lst hours of work to rms and working
mst   mdt net hours in the bank of other households. In both cases, the household earns the
hourly market-clearing real wage wt. Firms pay as dividends dtntxt for the equity share ntxt
owned by the household . As another source of income, the government gives households a net
transfer payment gt also expressed in units of the consumption basket.
Income is spent on purchases of consumption goods, ct, on a net increase of portfolio in-
vestment, vtnt (xt+1   xt), on purchases of new rms for a total value of vtnetxt+1, and on net
purchases of government bonds, (1 + rbt )
 1bt+1   bt. Putting together terms on ntxt simplies
the household budget constraint to
wt(l
s
t +m
s
t  mdt ) + bt + (dt + vt)ntxt + gt = ct + vt (nt + net)xt+1 + (1 + rbt ) 1bt+1. (4)
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Also as in Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), household preferences are dened through a log
utility function, separable between consumption and leisure: Future utility is brought to the
current time by applying a constant discount factor per period, . Total time available is
normalized at 1.0. Thus, the representative household maximizes
1X
j=0
j

 log ct+j + (1  ) log
 
1  lst+j  mst+j

;
subject to constraints (3) and (4) for the current period t and all future periods. The set of
rst order conditions of the household is
=ct   t + t = 0; (ct)
  (1  ) = (1  lst  mst) + twt = 0; (lst ;mst)
 twt   t (1 )(ct+n
e
tvtxt+1)
mdt
= 0; (mdt )
 t(1 + rbt ) 1 + t+1   t (ct+n
e
tvtxt+1)
bt+1+ntvt
= 0; (bt+1)
 tvt (nt + net ) + t+1 (dt+1 + vt+1)nt+1 + tnetvt = 0; (xt+1)
where t and t are Lagrange multipliers respectively associated to the nancial constraint (2)
and the budget constraint (4). In this model, nancial frictions a¤ect consumption, equity
investment, and labor supply decisions through two main variables. First, we dene, t; the
marginal nance cost as1
t = wt
@mdt
@
Lt
Pct
@
Lt
Pct
@ct
=
wtmdt
(1 )(ct+netvtxt+1) ; (5)
which represents the real marginal cost of producing liquidity. Second, the marginal nancial
services of bonds can be measured by the increase in real income equivalent to the collateral
value of bonds. Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) refer to this as the "liquidity service yield"
of the bond and denote it as LSYt
LSYt = wt
@mdt
@
Lt
Pct
@
Lt
Pct
@bt+1
=
wtmdt
(1 )(bt+1+ntvt) : (6)
1The technical appendix provides the partial derivatives of the loan production function used for the calcu-
lation of t and LSYt.
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Using the rst order condition of the demand for banking labor (mdt ) and equation (5) results
in t =  tt, which can be inserted in the rst order condition of consumption to nd how
the shadow value of consumption, t =
=ct
1+t
, is determined by the marginal utility of consump-
tion divided by one plus the marginal nance cost. This expression for t, the corresponding
expression for t+1, the previous result t =  tt, and equation (6) of the denition of LSY
are substituted in the rst order condition of bonds (bt+1) to reach the following equation for
intertemporal allocation of consumption

ct (1 + t)

1
1 + rbt
  LSYt

= 

ct+1
 
1 + t+1
 : (7)
As implied by (7), the consumption-saving decision is a¤ected by nancial factors according to
two channels. First, the shadow value of consumption is corrected by the external nance cost
in either the current or future periods because consumption requires addition loan production
according to the nancial constraint (2). Second, the liquidity service yield of bonds adds
up for the total return on saving. Subsequently, households tend to hold more bonds to take
advantage of both the market return and their collateral services.2
Turning to equity investment, rst order conditions (mdt ), and (xt+1) can be combined with
the denition of t given in expression (4) to obtain
tvt (nt + n
e
t ) = t+1 (dt+1 + vt+1)nt+1   ttnetvt;
that can be rearranged to nd the intertemporal optimal portfolio condition
tvt (nt + n
e
t (1 + t)) = t+1 (dt+1 + vt+1)nt+1: (8)
In equilibrium, the value of current portfolio investment (left-hand side of 8) is determined by
the nancial conditions through the (1 + t) increasing factor. Thus, if the economy su¤ers
from a more severe nancial constraint (higher t), the left-hand side of (8) pushes up and
the household would restore equilibrium by increasing current consumption and reducing the
2The semi-loglinear version of (7) is log ct = log ct+1 
 
t   t+1
  rbt + LSYt, where current consumption
is inversely related to the liquidity service yield of bonds.
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investment in equity shares. The nancial cost of rm creation has a negative impact on equity
investment.
Finally, labor e¤ort is split up between working either in rms or at the banks. Financial
frictions a¤ect the trade-o¤s between consumption and leisure through the shadow value of
consumption that depends on the marginal nance cost t. Hence, the labor supply equation
can be obtained by combining the rst order conditions (lst ), (m
s
t) and (ct) with the denition
(5) to reach
1  
1  lst  mst
= wt

ct (1 + t)
: (9)
The marginal nance cost t reduces the shadow value of one unit of consumption on the right-
hand side of (9). Therefore, consumption is less desirable and leisure rises on the left-hand side
of (9) with the result of a decrease in the optimal labor supply.3
2.2 Firms
Firms specialize in the production of one type of good, which makes the number of goods iden-
tical to the number of rms.4 In period t, operating rms provide nal goods for consumption
using the linear production function,
yft (!) = Al
d
t (!) ;
where ldt (!) is the demand of labor by rm ! and A > 0 is a constant productivity parameter.
Recalling the constant elasticity of substitution across goods, , the amount of rm-specic
output, yft (!), is demand-determined in response to the relative price
Pt(!)
P ct
and to the aggregate
3Using log(1+t) ' t, a semi-loglinear aproximation to (9) reads l
s
1 ls m log l
s
t +
m
1 ls m logm
s
t = logwt 
log ct t, where l and m are steady-state levels of the supply of labor to the rms and to the banking activities,
respectively. Such expression identies the marginal nance cost t as a determinant of labor supply with a
negative semielasticity   1 ls mls .
4Taking a broader view, it could be said that the creation of one new good corresponds to either one additional
production line in an existing rm or the creation of a single new rm.
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demand for output, yt, as follows
yft (!) =

Pt (!)
P ct
 
yt:
Firms seek to maximize prot. In turn, the representative rm ! will choose Pt (!) to maximize
the real dividend dt(!),
dt (!) =
Pt (!)
P ct
yft (!)  wtldt (!) ,
that using the production technology for ldt (!) and the demand curve for y
f
t (!) becomes
dt (!) =

Pt (!)
P ct
1 
yt   wt
A

Pt (!)
P ct
 
yt.
The optimality condition on Pt (!) required to maximize dt (!) is
(1  )

Pt (!)
P ct
 
yt
P ct
+
wt
A


Pt (!)
P ct
  1
yt
P ct
= 0;
which can be simplied and expressed in terms of the relative price, t (!) =
Pt(!)
P ct
, to give
t (!) =

   1
wt
A
: (10)
Firm creation and destruction determines how the number of goods available for consumption
varies from period to period. Following Bilbiie et al. (2010), it is assumed that it takes one
period to build the product line (rm) that is specialized in the production of a new good.
We also borrow from that paper the assumption that rm destruction is given by a constant
proportion  of all existing rms. Thus, the number of rms in period t, nt, depends on both
the number of rms in the previous period, nt 1, and also on the number of rms that were
created during the previous period; net 1; according to the dynamic equation
nt = (1  )
 
nt 1 + net 1

: (11)
The decision of investing in starting new rms is determined when the household compares
the prospective value of the new rm, vt (!) ; with the marginal cost of entry in the goods
market. Bilbiie et al. (2010) also assume that rms face a sunk cost of entry (as in Judd,
1985, and Romer, 1990, among others), measured as fe e¤ective labor units. Therefore, the
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entry cost is equal to fe wtA in terms of baskets of consumption goods. This specication ensures
that exogenous productivity shocks a¤ect symmetrically both production of existing goods and
creation of new products.5 New rms enter the economy as long as the expected total prot
coming from producing nal goods in the future is greater than this cost.6 Thus, in equilibrium
the number of new rms that enter the market is determined by the no-arbitrage condition,
vt (!) = fe
wt
A
: (12)
2.3 Aggregation and general equilibrium
Since all rms share the same technology, entry costs and demand conditions, there is a complete
symmetric equilibrium in which Pt (!) = Pt, t (!) = t; y
f
t (!) = y
f
t ; l
d
t (!) = l
d
t ; dt (!) =
d; and vt (!) = vt. In turn, the consumption price index is,
P ct =
Z nt
0
Pt (!)
1  d!
1=(1 )
= n
1
1 
t Pt;
which implies that the relative price, t =
Pt
P ct
, is tied up to the total number of rms by the
"variety e¤ect",
t = n
1
 1
t : (13)
Meanwhile, real aggregate output is,
yt =
Z nt
0
t (!) y
f
t (!) d! = ntty
f
t ; (14)
which indicates that aggregate output is jointly determined by the extensive margin of the
number of rms, nt, and the intensive margin of rm-level output, ty
f
t , expressed in terms of
baskets of consumption goods.
5Another approach introduced by Corsetti and Begin (2008) assumes a xed entry cost that is directly paid
in terms of the consumption goods basket. Finally, Lewis (2009) assumes a congestion cost that increases with
the number of competitors.
6In symmetric equilibrium, rm value is the discounted sum of all future dividends, vt =
P1
j=1 t+1;t+jdt+j
where the stochastic discount factor is t+1;t+;j = 
j
k=1

1
1+rt+k 1
  LSYt+k 1

nt+k 1+net+k 1(1+t+k 1)
nt+k

.
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The symmetric equilibrium requires that the representative household owns all the equity
share, xt = xt 1 = 1. In addition, the labor market-clearing condition is lst =
R nt
0
ldt (!) d!,
equivalent to
lst = ntl
d
t ; (15)
and the goods market-clearing condition is,7
yt = ct + vtn
e
t ; (16)
where aggregate output, yt, is spent either on purchases of baskets of consumption goods, ct,
or on investment spending to acquire new rms, vtnet . In summary, a competitive equilibrium
is dened as a sequence of quantities
fQtg1t=0 =
n
yt; y
f
t ; ct; l
s
t ; l
d
t ;m
s
t ;m
d
t ; nt; n
e
t ; xt+1; bt+1
o1
t=0
;
and a sequence of real prices and returns,
fPtg1t=0 =

t; wt; r
b
t ; vt; dt
	1
t=0
;
that satisfy the rst order conditions of the households, maximize rm dividend and keep the
goods market, the labor market and the asset market in equilibrium.
2.4 The steady state
The general equilibrium just derived abstracts from long-run economic growth because produc-
tivity, labor and the number of rms are constant in steady state. Therefore, time subscripts
might be dropped to directly indicate steady-state (constant) levels.
The dynamic equation for the evolution of the number of rms (11) brings a proportional
relationship between new rms and total rms in steady state,
ne = 
1 n: (17)
7Proof available in technical appendix.
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The steady-state value of the rm is obtained by rewriting (8) in steady state to cancel out the
Lagrange multipliers,
v (n+ ne (1 + )) =  (d+ v)n;
and then using (17) to drop the variable that determines the number of rms n;
v
 
1 + 
1  (1 + )

=  (d+ v) ;
to nally solve the expression for v as follows,
v =

(1 )
1 (1 )+

d: (18)
Remarkably, the marginal nance cost  erodes the value of rm equity in steady state. The
need for loans to nance the creation of goods-rms explains why a higher marginal nance
cost reduces the equity value.
The free entry condition (12) in steady state with symmetric equilibrium is,
v = fe
w
A
: (19)
Recalling (13), the real price of individual goods in steady state is,
 = n
1
 1 : (20)
Optimal pricing implies applying a constant mark-up between the relative price, t (!) =
Pt (!) =P
c
t ; and the real marginal cost,
wt
A
, as indicated in (10). Such expression in steady
state yields,
 = 
 1
w
A
: (21)
The goods-market equilibrium condition (16) in steady state is,
y = c+ nev: (22)
Recalling (14), the relationship between economy-wide output and rm-level output with prod-
uct variety in steady state is,
y = nyf : (23)
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The short-run equilibrium condition for asset holdings symmetry in steady state is,
x = 1: (24)
The steady-state marginal nance cost  can be obtained by rewriting equation (5) in steady
state,
 = wm
(1 )(c+nevx) : (25)
The rm-level linear production function in the steady-state solution of the symmetric equilib-
rium is
yf = Al: (26)
Using the market-clearing condition for labor, ls = nl, the labor supply equation (9) in steady
state becomes,
1  
1  nl  m = w

c (1 + )
: (27)
Under complete equilibrium symmetry, the amount of rm prot is dt = ty
f
t   wtA yft , which
implies the following steady-state expression,
d =

  w
A

yf : (28)
The loan production technology (3) in steady state reads,
L=P c = B (b+ nv)m1 ; (29)
while the nancial constraint (2) determines the demand for liquidity in steady state as follows,
c+ nevx = V
L
P c
: (30)
Finally, it is assumed, as in Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), that the stock of government
bonds is at some constant proportion of output in steady state,
b = 	y: (31)
The steady state solution of the model provides numerical values to fteen variables: n, , w,
c, ne, x, , v, l, y, yf , d, L=P c, b, and m, obtained by solving the above non-linear system of
fteen equations, (17)-(31), using the calibration of model parameters to be introduced next.
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3 Calibration and steady-state solution
Table 1 provides the numbers chosen in the calibration of the model meant for quarterly ob-
servations.
Table 1. Baseline calibration of parameters.
Consumption weight  = 0:35
Discount factor  = 0:995
Productivity A = 1:0
Death shock  = 0:025
Scale parameter in entry cost fe = 3:78
Demand elasticity  = 3:8
Steady-state debt-output ratio 	 = 0:51
Labor share in loan production  = 0:65
Scale parameter in loan production B = 4:90
Loan velocity V = 0:40
Portfolio investment monitoring  = 0:49
The constant discount factor is set at  = 0:995, which leaves the detrended steady-state real
interest rate at r = 0:005 per quarter, 2% in annualized terms. The value assigned to the
consumption weight in the utility function,  = 0:35, implies that households spend one third
of their time on working activities, following the standard assumption used in the real-business-
cycle literature.8 Similarly, the scale parameter of loan production technology is set at the value
B = 4:90 that matches the steady-state share of banking labor with the corresponding number
found in recent data.9 Moreover, we chose the scale parameter of the entry cost function that
results in a number of existing rms in steady-state at n = 1, to have it normalized against
the case with constant number of rms. It implies fe = 3:78. As in Bilbiie et al. (2010), the
8Since total time is normalized at 1.0, we have ls +m = 1=3 in steady state.
9The Bureau of Economic Analysis reports that the number of people employed in banking activities is 0.84%
of total private employment in May 2010: Accordingly, we have mls+m = 0:0084 in the steady-state solution when
B = 4:90.
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death shock that determines rm destruction is  = 0:025, which indicates that 2.5% of rms
fail every quarter, 10% in annualized terms. The parameter that determines the Dixit-Stiglitz
elasticity in the demand curve is the standard value  = 3:8, which implies a 35% mark-up in
steady state.
For the banking parameters, we follow Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) to specify a share
for banking labor in loan production at  = 0:65, while the velocity parameter is V = 0:40
to match US data.10 As collateral value, the stock of bonds in steady state represents 51%
of output, 	 = 0:51, to match the average b=y ratio found in US data over the last 40 years.
Finally, the parameter that penalizes the collateral services of equity with respect to bonds is
set at  = 0:49 to have both the steady-state market return of bonds and the LSY at 1% per
year, i.e. rb = LSY = 0:0025, as also suggested in Goodfriend and McCallum (2007).11
To evaluate the role of rm entry/exit and nancial constraints, we report in Table 2 the
steady state solution of the model under the baseline calibration and two more variants. First,
the case that ignores rm creation and destruction by dropping both the free entry condition
(19) and the rm accumulation equation (17), while xing n = 1 and ne = 0 instead. Secondly,
the model without banking elements can be reached when dropping the nancial constraint
(2) from the optimizing program of the representative household. The set of equations that
determine the steady state solution of these variants can be found in the technical appendix.12
10The velocity parameter V takes the value consistent with the number chosen in Goodfriend and McCallum
(2007) for the particular case of lack of nancial requirements for rm creation. It brings the formula V =
0:31 (1 + vne=c); which leads to V = 0:40 in the baseline calibration.
11From equations (5) and (6), LSY = wm(1 )(b+nv) and
1
1+ =
1
1+rb
 LSY for the steady-state computation
of rb and LSY .
12For a fair comparison to the baseline model, the parameters  and V were recalibrated in the model with
no rm entry/exit to follow the criteria dened in Goodfriend and McCallum (2007). In turn, the parameters
 and V reported in Table 1 are respectively replaced for  = 0:08 and V = 0:31.
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Table 2. Steady-state solution.
Baseline model No rm entry/exit No nancial friction
Firm value; v 2.7850 14.782 2.8172
Firm dividend, d 0.0870 0.0739 0.0867
Firm return, d=v 0.0312 0.0050 0.0308
Firm entry, ne 0.0256 - 0.0265
Relative price,  1.0000 1.0000 1.0112
Total rms, n 1.0000 1.0000 1.0327
Output, y 0.3305 0.2809 0.3402
Real wage; w 0.7368 0.7368 0.7454
Labor supply, ls 0.3305 0.2809 0.3363
Consumption, c 0.2591 0.2809 0.2656
Investment, vne 0.0713 - 0.0746
Firm output, yf 0.3305 0.2809 0.3292
Finance cost,  0.0178 0.0108 -
Banking labor, m 0.0028 0.0014 -
As shown in Table 2, the market value of rms is signicantly higher in the model without
rm entry and exit. Hence, rm value is equivalent to 8.43 times quarterly output in the
baseline model (2.7850/0.3305) whereas it is more than 50 times in the model without rm
entry (14.782/0.2809). Such di¤erence can be explained by applying the never-die condition of
the rm,  = 0, in the equity value equation (18) that makes the level of v soar for any given
steady-state dividend d. Conversely, the steady-state return of equity is much higher in the
models with variable number of rms, which must take into account the rate of rm destruction
at  = 2:5% as a sort of equity value depreciation. To compensate for that, the steady-state
quarterly return in the baseline model is at d=v = 3:12% whereas it is at d=v = 0:5% in the
model without rm entry and exit.
Another key di¤erence is that the baseline model shows that a part of income is spent
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on equity investment for creating new rms and the rest on purchases of consumption goods.
Concretely, consumption takes a share of c
y
= 0:78 and investment the complementary share
vne
y
= 0:22. The model with no rm entry and exit abstracts from equity investment and leaves
all the spending for consumption goods. In turn, we observe a contractionary e¤ect on both the
labor supply and output. Table 2 documents that they are 15% lower in that model with no
rm entry/exit compared to the baseline model ( :2809
:3305
 1 =  0:15): The impossibility of equity
investment makes consumption higher and the labor supply shrinks in (27). Finally, both the
marginal nance cost and banking labor are signicantly lower in the model without rm entry
and exit. On the one hand, there is no nancial need for creating rms which reduces the
demand for loans. On the other hand, the market value of rms is much higher and provides a
stronger collateral guarantee for loan production technology that saves banking labor.
Regarding the case with no nancial friction, it can be observed in Table 2 that the steady-
state numbers are close to those obtained in the baseline model. However, some increase
in economic activity is noticeable. The market value of rms rises which encourages rm
creation and equity investment. Moreover, labor supply expands as the nance cost of spending
disappears from (27). In turn, rm entry, total rms, labor supply, output, consumption and
investment increase by percentages between 1.5% and 5%. Meanwhile, rm-level output declines
by just 0.4%.
4 Quantitative analysis
This section explores the quantitative implications of endogenous rm creation when external
nance is required. In particular, we will assess the steady state e¤ects of variations in the
constant levels of labor productivity, banking e¢ ciency and goods substitutability in the three
(comparative) scenarios introduced in the previous section.
Productivity
A 10% increase in labor productivity occurs when raising the constant A from the initially
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Figure 1: Steady-state reponses to a permanent 10% increase of productivity.
calibrated value A = 1:0 to A0 = 1:1. Figure 1 displays the steady-state e¤ects observed on the
endogenous variables across model variants.
In the model without rm entry/exit, higher productivity results in greater increases on
rm-level output, the dividend and the equity value. The absence of new entries facilitates
that the constant number of competitors take advantage of higher productivity. In the model
variants with endogenous rm creation, the free entry condition (19) determines an increase
in the number of rms proportional to the increase in productivity due to falling entry costs.
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The model variant that eliminates the nancial constraint brings a slightly higher rm value
and further rm entry compared to the baseline model. Therefore, the impact of the nancial
friction is not quantitatively remarkable.
As for the responses of aggregate variables, Figure 1 shows how the increase in aggregate
output is stronger in the models with variable number of rms. The entry of new rms clearly
o¤sets the weaker reaction of output per rm and causes aggregate output to rise at a higher
rate than the increase in productivity (beyond 13%). The response of the labor supply is
quantitatively small as a result of two opposing e¤ects: the higher real wage pushes up labor
supply whereas higher consumption reduces the marginal utility and pushes it down. The latter
e¤ect slightly dominates over the former as labor supply falls between 0.25% (with rm entry)
and 0.10% (without rm entry). The responses of aggregate consumption and the real wage are
quite signicant and stronger in the models with endogenous rm creation (beyond the percent
increase in productivity). Finally, the marginal nance cost rises at similar rates to output due
to the increase in the demand for loans to cover the additional expenditures on consumption
and investment.
If the nancial constraint is dropped, output, consumption and total rms report a slightly
higher reaction to the productivity improvement. As there is no marginal nance cost, both
labor supply and rm creation grow faster than in the model with a nancial constraint.
Banking e¢ ciency
The scale parameter B of the loan production function (3) can measure the e¢ ciency of
banking technology. Figure 2 informs on the steady-state reactions observed in the model when
B is raised from its calibrated value to a 10% higher level.13
The quantitative implications of the improvement in banking technology are signicantly
smaller than those observed when labor productivity was raised. However, the results indicate
that the dynamics of rm creation and destruction amplify the steady-state e¤ects of an im-
provement in banking e¢ ciency. Thus, the response of aggregate output is more than three
13The model variant without nancial frictions is not included because it does not incorporate loan production.
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Figure 2: Steady-state reponses to a 10% increase of banking e¢ ciency.
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times in the model with rm entry compared to the model without it (0.69% increase in the
model with rm entry and 0.22% in the model without it). The transmission mechanism from
the banking sector to the real economy takes place through the marginal nance cost, . Figure
1 shows how a 10% increase in banking e¢ ciency cuts the marginal nance cost  by around
25%, which increases rm value between 0.2% and 0.3% in (18). The subsequent rm creation
occurs as long as equity value exceeds the entry cost in (19). In turn, the model with rm
entry gives nearly a 0.8% increase in the number of rms when banking e¢ ciency rises by 10%.
The relative price increases by nearly 0.3% because there are more goods produced in the econ-
omy. Meanwhile, rm-level output declines around 0.35% which means that there would be an
scenario with more rms of smaller size.
In the model without rm entry/exit, Figure 1 displays how the adjustment fully takes
place through the rm-level margin: the lower marginal nance cost gives rise to higher rm-
level dividend, equity value and output, keeping the number of rms constant. Among other
reasonable results are the positive response of the labor supply (around 0.4% in the baseline
model and 0.2% in the model with no rm entry/exit) because the labor supply curve (27)
includes the marginal nance cost  as a (negatively-signed) determinant of labor supply. The
response of consumption is also higher in the model with endogenous rm creation (0.59%
versus 0.22%) as expected from the di¤erences observed in the responses of aggregate income.
Finally, the real wage slightly rises in the model with rm entry because it depends on the
number of rms, whereas it remains constant in the model without rm entry/exit because it
only depends on the (constant) mark-up and the (constant) relative price.
Elasticity of substitution (mark-up)
The last exercise consists of increasing the elasticity of substitution  by 10%. This implies
lowering the mark-up, 
 1 , by 12% due to greater product di¤erentiation.
14 Figure 3 provides
14It should be noticed that a higher  implies a lower  1 : Using  = 3:8 and 
0 = (1 + 0:1)3:8 = 4:18 leads
to a reduction in the mark-up from 35.71% with  = 3:8 to 31.45% with 0 = 4:18: This is a 12% reduction in
percentage terms.
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the plots of responses observed in the three model variants. In the cases with rm entry/exit,
the rm dividend, d, is negatively a¤ected by an increase in the elasticity of substitution, ,
through a lower mark-up connecting equations (21) and (28): Moreover, the increase in the
elasticity of substitution penalizes the steady-state rm value v given in (18), through this
lower d and also because of the substantial increase observed in the marginal nance cost, .
Indeed, our results indicate that a 10% higher elasticity of substitution reduces the steady-state
rm value by 1% in the model variants with rm entry/exit. Such fall of equity value slows
down the ow of rm entry and the number of goods available for consumption: the number
of rms falls by slightly below 12%. These models report a signicant expansion in rm-level
output (nearly a 10% increase). This result is interesting: if the mark-up falls the market
reshapes with less rms that produce more output each in a way that makes it go away from
a perfect competition scenario of many-and-small rms. A symmetric change that raised the
mark-up would result in net rm entry, higher number of rms and lower production in each
rm.
The model variant with no rm entry/exit shows how a lower mark-up gets transmitted
into a much higher reduction in rm value, (around 7 times that found in the baseline model).
This occurs because equity value is much more sensitive to any change in the dividend in the
variant where the rms never die. By contrast, rm-level output clearly reports a more modest
increase because there is no reduction in the number of rms.
The impact of higher elasticity of substitution (lower mark-up) on aggregate output is of
di¤erent sign across models. Thus, both model variants with rm creation and destruction
show that aggregate output falls by nearly 4%, whereas the model that does not allow for
rm entry reports an opposing increase of aggregate output by 2%. The decline in aggregate
output observed in the model with endogenous number of rms is mostly explained by the 12%
reduction in the total number of rms entering (23). The lower mark-up eliminates competitors,
discouraged when looking at the prospects of lower dividends, and increases the rm-level
output. In the model with no nancial friction, the responses of output, consumption, total
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Figure 3: Steady-state reponses to a 10% higher elasticity of substitution (12% lower mark-up).
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rms and the labor supply are very similar to the baseline model, which again emphasizes the
little quantitative impact of the nancial constraint.
Shutting down the possibility of rm entry/exit eliminates the negative impact of lower
mark-up on total rms. In contrast, rms cut prices when applying the lower mark-up, which
stimulates demand. Hence, the real wage, labor supply and aggregate output rise after a decline
in the mark-up in the model without rm entry.15 Therefore, if rm entry is allowed, a higher
mark-up results in an economic expansion in terms of number of rms and aggregate output. If
rm entry is not considered, a higher mark-up would rise prices, cut the real wage and reduce
aggregate output.
As a summary, Table 3 reproduces percent reactions of some aggregate variables observed
across model variants. The numbers reported bring a factor decomposition of aggregate output
in terms of supply components, demand components and income shares.
Table 3. Simulation results. % steady-state responses after 10% increase in16
productivity A banking e¢ ciency B elas. of subs. 
Base No e/e No ¤ Base No entry/exit Base No e/e No ¤
Aggregate output, y 13.35 9.90 13.81 0.69 0.22 -3.73 2.11 -3.49
Supply decomposition, y = nyf
Total rms, n 9.51 0.0 10.0 0.77 0.0 -11.98 0.0 -11.56
Firm-level output, yf 3.51 9.90 3.33 -0.08 0.22 9.92 2.11 9.65
Demand decomposition, y = c+ vne
Consumption, c 13.42 9.90 13.81 0.59 0.22 -1.26 2.11 -1.03
Investment, vne 13.12 0.0 13.81 1.05 0.0 -12.69 0.0 -12.26
Income decomposition, y = wls + dn
Labor income, wls 13.35 9.90 13.81 0.69 0.22 -0.60 5.44 -0.36
Equity income, dn 13.35 9.90 13.81 0.69 0.22 -12.48 -7.17 -12.26
15The real wage falls in the model without rm entry because it is required to hold (21) for a constant  when
there is an increase in the mark-up  1 .
16"Base" is Baseline model, "No e/e" is the model variant with no rm entry/exit, and "No ¤" is the model
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The contribution of the total number of rms (dynamics of rm creation/destruction) plays
a very important role to explain the reaction of output to changes in productivity, banking ef-
ciency and the elasticity of substitution (market power). By contrast, the intensive margin of
output (at rm level) shows little reaction after a technology shock and opposing (countercycli-
cal) reactions after changes in either banking e¢ ciency or market power. In the model without
rm entry/exit, the responses of aggregate output are fully determined by the responses of
rm-level output.
Regarding the decomposition of demand, the baseline model shows responses of both con-
sumption and investment of similar size to those of aggregate output when there is a produc-
tivity improvement (slightly higher on investment). They are identical if there is no nancial
distortion, whereas the e¤ect is fully taken for consumption spending in the model with no
entry/exit of rms. By contrast, after a change in banking e¢ ciency and, especially, a change
in the elasticity of substitution (mark-up) investment shows a reaction much larger than that
of consumption. Thus, investment on creating new rms falls by more than 12% when there
is a 10% higher elasticity of substitution that cuts the mark-up by 12%, which is more than
10 times higher than the percent decline observed in purchases of consumption goods (between
1.26% and 1.03%). The model with no entry and exit of rms gives the same 2.11% expansion
on output and consumption when there is a decline in the mark-up.
Finally, the income decomposition reported in Table 3 indicates that the increase of output
is equally distributed among labor income and equity income when there is an improvement in
either productivity or banking e¢ ciency. Nevertheless, the e¤ects of a change in the elasticity
of substitution (mark-up) are absorbed quite more signicantly in equity income than in labor
income, especially in the models with rm entry and exit. The sizeable responses of both the
dividend and the number of rms explain why equity income is so sensitive to changes in the
mark-up.
variant with no nancial friction.
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5 Conclusions
This paper has investigated the steady state consequences of combining nancial frictions with
rm entry-and-exit in a model where the level of economic activity depends both on the number
of rms (extensive margin of activity) and on the production of individual rms (intensive
margin of activity). In this setting, nancial factors have permanent e¤ects on the competitive
equilibrium through the inuence of the external nance cost upon the market value of rms
and labor supply.
The economic analysis results in three main conclusions. First, the nancial constraint has
contractionary e¤ects on both the equity value and the labor supply of households. In turn, the
steady-state levels of rm entry, total rms, labor supply, output, consumption and investment
fall by percentages between 1.5% and 5%.
Secondly, rm creation amplies the impact of an improvement in either labor productivity
or bank e¢ ciency on aggregate activity as it collects a procyclical change in the number of
rms. In a quantitative comparison, we nd that the reaction of aggregate output becomes
35% greater when there is a change in labor productivity and more than 3 times greater when
there is a change in banking e¢ ciency.
And thirdly, a higher elasticity of substitution (that implies a decrease of the mark-up) has
a negative impact on aggregate output because of a substantial reduction in the number of
rms. This last result is reversed in a model without rm entry and exit where both labor
supply and output rise with a lower mark-up.
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Appendix
Technical Appendix 1. Loan production technology
The partial derivatives relating the change in the amount of loans to the change in the
factors of loan production are,
@
Lt
Pct
@mdt
= B (1  ) (bt+1 + nt+1vt+1)(mdt )  =
(1 ) Lt
Pct
mdt
= 1
V
(1 )(ct+netvtxt+1)
mdt
;
@
Lt
Pct
@bt+1
= B(bt+1 + ntvt)
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1 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V
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Technical Appendix 2. Overall resource constraint.
Combining the household budget constraint,
wt(l
s
t +m
s
t  mdt ) + bt + (dt + vt)ntxt + gt = ct + vt (nt + net)xt+1 + (1 + rbt ) 1bt+1,
with the government budget constraint, gt = (1 + rbt )
 1bt+1   bt, the market-clearing condition
of rm labor lst = ntl
d
t , the market-clearing condition for banking labor, m
s
t = m
d
t , and the
market-clearing condition for portfolio shares, xt = xt+1 = 1, it is obtained,
wtntl
d
t + (dt + vt)nt = ct + vt (nt + n
e
t) ,
where dropping vtnt on both sides, it is equivalent to,
wtntl
d
t + dtnt = ct + vtn
e
t . (A1)
Under symmetric equilibrium, current dividends are determined as,
dt = ty
f
t  
wt
A
yft ;
where applying the mark-up pricing policy t =

 1
wt
A
gives,
dt =

 1
wt
A
yft  
wt
A
yft =
 
1
 1
 wt
A
yft : (A2)
Substituting (A2) into (A1) leads to,
wtntl
d
t +
 
1
 1
 wt
A
yft nt = ct + vtn
e
t ;
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where using the linear production technology under symmetric equilibrium, yft = Al
d
t , it is
obtained,
wt
A
nty
f
t +
 
1
 1
 wt
A
yft nt = ct + vtn
e
t : (A3)
Finally, putting together terms that come with yft transforms (A3) as follows,
 

 1
 wt
A
nty
f
t = ct + vtn
e
t ;
where inserting wt =  1 At from the mark-up denition results in the overall resources con-
straint,
ntty
f
t = ct + vtn
e
t ; (A4)
The left-hand side of (A4) is total output produced in the economy computed as the product
of rm-level output times the relative price times the number of goods-rms, yt = ntty
f
t .
On the right-hand side of (A4), total spending is the sum of purchases of consumption goods
and spending on acquiring newly created rms. Equation (A4) brings, therefore, the overall
resources constraint,
yt = ct + vtn
e
t :
Technical Appendix 3. Model without rm entry and exit.
The model with constant number of rms can be considered a particular case of the baseline
model: The free entry condition and the rm accumulation equation are ignored while setting
n = 1 and ne = 0 instead.
In turn, equation (8) from the main text results in a steady-state rm value that only
depends upon dividends and the discount parameter:
v =


1  

d: (A5)
As extensive margin uctuations are shut down, economy-wide output and rm-level output
coincide,
y = yf : (A6)
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The real wage is fully determined by the elasticity of substitution and labor productivity,
w =  1

A: (A7)
The lack of investment makes the goods market equilibrium collect only spending consumption
goods,
y = c: (A8)
The equilibrium condition for asset holdings symmetry in steady state brings,
x = 1; (A9)
while the steady-state marginal nance cost  becomes,
 = wm
(1 )c : (A10)
The rm-level production function is the linear technology,
yf = Al; (A11)
and the labor supply equation in steady state is,
1  
1  l  m = w

c (1 + )
: (A12)
Under complete equilibrium symmetry, the steady-state dividend is,
d =

1  w
A

yf : (A13)
The loan production technology is,
L=P c = B (b+ v)m1 ; (A14)
and the stock of government bonds is assumed to be proportional to output in steady state,
b = 	y: (A15)
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Finally, the nancial constraint only takes into account liquidity requirements for consumption
spending,
c = V
L
P c
: (A16)
The steady state solution of the twelve endogenous variables: w, c, x, , v, l, y, yf , d, L=P c, b,
and m, is determined by solving the non-linear system of twelve equations (A5)-(A16).
Technical Appendix 4. Model without nancial frictions
Dropping the nancial constraint from the household optimizing program results in the
following steady-state system of equations:
ne = 
1 n; (A17)
v =

(1 )
1 (1 )

d; (A18)
v = fe
w
A
; (A19)
 = n
1
 1 ; (A20)
 = 
 1
w
A
; (A21)
y = c+ nev; (A22)
y = nyf ; (A23)
x = 1; (A24)
yf = Al; (A25)
1  
1  nl = w

c
; (A26)
d =

  w
A

yf : (A27)
The steady state solution of the model provides numerical values to eleven variables: n, , w,
c, ne, x, v, l, y, yf , and d, obtained by solving the above non-linear system of eleven equations,
(A17)-(A27), using the calibration of model parameters presented in the next.
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